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Abstract
This paper investigates whether external political pressure for faster renminbi
(RMB) appreciation affect both the daily returns and the conditional volatility of
the RMB central parity rate. We construct several political pressure indicators
pertaining to the RMB exchange rate, with a special emphasis on the US pressure,
to test the hypothesis. After controlling for Chinese macroeconomic surprise news,
we find that US and non-US political pressure does not have a significant influence
on RMB’s daily returns. However, evidence suggests that political pressures, and
especially those from the US, have statistically significant impacts on the conditional
volatility of the RMB. Furthermore, we conduct the same exercise on the 12-month
RMB non-deliverable forward rate (NDF). We find that the NDF market is highly
responsive to macroeconomic surprise news and there is some evidence that Sino-US
bilateral meetings affect the conditional volatility of the RMB NDF.
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1 Introduction
The Chinese currency, renminbi or yuan (RMB or CNY), had been appreciating at a
gradual pace against the US dollar (USD) since the exchange rate reform on the 21st
of July 2005. The RMB exchange rate reform, which switched from a USD peg to
a “managed float” against a basket of currencies, has been based on the principles of
“independent initiative, controllability, and gradual progress” despite of having gone
through various phases of faster or slower appreciations.1 The RMB appreciated by
3.4% in 2006 and a further 6.9% in 2007 against the USD. Overall, the CNY/USD
exchange rate has appreciated by more than 16% by August of 2008 and 20% by the
end of May 2011.
The reformed RMB exchange rate system offers a rare opportunity to study an ex-
change rate arrangement that is gaining greater importance in the world foreign exchange
markets and is yet largely subjected to government policy and the political interference.
Furthermore, China’s move to greater flexibility in terms of the RMB is taking place
while the currency is not yet fully convertible; capital controls are still in place; and
financial institutions are not yet liberalised. It is partly because of these features that
the price formation mechanism of the RMB is not yet fully market driven. Meanwhile,
considerable external pressure, particularly motivated by global economic imbalances,
has been exerted on the Chinese authorities to allow for more rapid appreciation of the
RMB.
Frankel and Wei (2007) provides a broad assessment of China’s exchange rate system
from 2005 until early 2007. It estimates, among other things, the implicit basket weights
with a refined technique introduced by Frankel and Wei (1994) and concludes that there
is a “modest but steady increase in flexibility” since July 2005. The paper also tests
briefly whether US pressure, collected from major US newspapers, has promoted flexi-
bility in the RMB exchange rate returns. It does not find statistically significant effect
of US pressure between the 1st of July 2005 and 8th of January 2007 after controlling
for the determinants of the currency basket. In another study, Funke and Gronwald
(2008) analyses the gradual reform process in the RMB exchange rate with time-varying
smooth transition autoregression GARCH models (TV-AR-GARCH). Funke and Gron-
wald (2008) presents empirical evidence that such models are well suited to capture the
smooth nonlinear evolution of the RMB exchange rate regime.
In this paper, we assess whether external political pressure from the United States
(US), the European Union (EU), Japan, and major international organisations has a
statistically significant impact on both the daily returns and the conditional volatil-
ity of the RMB central parity rate. In testing this hypothesis we control for China’s
macroeconomic surprise news from the monetary conditions, the economic activity, and
the external imbalances. Furthermore, we also assess the effect of external political
pressures on market expectations using the RMB non-deliverable forward (NDF) rates.
1From Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the Sixth ASEM Finance Ministers Meeting of the Asian-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) in the Tianjin, China on 26 June, 2005 (http://www.gov.cn/english/
2005-06/27/content_20385.htm)
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Political pressure and domestic macroeconomic news may induce market participants to
revise their expectations of what the CNY/USD exchange rate will be in the near term.
In addition, the NDF offers two main advantages over the central parity rate: first, the
market is offshore and therefore it is free of government control, and second the market
market is highly liquid.
We define external political pressure as policy statements or announcements by for-
eign officials and international organisations demanding for faster appreciation of the
RMB exchange rate. Political pressure is quantified with indicator variables based on a
newly constructed dataset, which collates public statements about the Chinese exchange
rate made by senior officials and representatives from either key economies in the world
or various international organisations. For example, these statements may come from
the President of the United States, Secretaries of the US Treasury and Department of
Commerce, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, influential US congressmen and
senators, prime ministers and senior economic officials from the EU and the Japanese
government, as well as head of important international organisations with focus on global
economy such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
We follow the foreign exchange intervention literature by applying an event study
methodology to investigate whether political pressure affects the RMB exchange rate.
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature that uses event studies with high frequency
data to evaluate effects of “news” in foreign exchange markets. Neely (2005) provides an
excellent review of recent studies, especially those pertaining to central bank interven-
tion in foreign exchange rate markets. While many event studies examine the efficacy
of actual central bank interventions in foreign exchange markets (for example, Fatum
and Hutchison, 2003 and 2006), Ito, 2002 , and Chaboud and Humpage, 2005, to name
a few recent studies), our paper falls into the category of the event studies literature
that examines whether news or central bank communications have any impact on the
daily exchange rate movements. For example Fratzscher (2008), among others, assesses
the effectiveness of central bank communication policies on the exchange rates of G-3
economies and finds that such policies are effective in influencing Dollar-Euro and Yen-
Dollar in the desired directions on intervention days. Fratzscher’s results also suggest
that central bank communications tend to reduce market volatility, whereas actual inter-
ventions increase market volatility. On the other hand, Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996)
and Dominguez (1998) find that news report of Japanese government interventions tend
to increase exchange rate volatility.
The contributions of this paper to the existing literature are as follows. First, un-
like the existing literature that mostly examines the effect of domestic interventions on
domestic currencies, this paper investigates the effect of external political pressure from
the US, the EU, Japan and international organisations on the exchange rate of a large
emerging market economy that is gaining prominence in the global economy. Secondly,
we construct various indicators that quantify the external pressure calling for faster
RMB appreciation based on a new dataset that collates news events related to the RMB
exchange rate issues since its reform in July 2005. Compared to the paper by Frankel
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and Wei (2007), our study includes: (1) a broader data source of political pressure, (2)
political pressure from non-US sources, (3) a longer time period (until May 2011), and
(4) testing whether conditional volatility is affected by external political statements.
Thirdly, we use a set of China specific macroeconomic control variables that allow us to
better identify the effect of external pressures on the daily returns of the RMB exchange
rate. Specifically, we use the deviations of real-time data from median market expec-
tations, or macroeconomic surprise news, to control for the underlying macroeconomic
climate.
The findings of this paper suggest that external political pressure does not seem
to have a statistically significant impact on daily returns of the RMB central parity
rate. There is, however, strong evidence that these political pressures do increase the
daily conditional volatility of the RMB central parity. Out of the underlying control
factors, we find that one-month interest rate differential between the US and China has
a significant impact on the pace of appreciation of the central parity rate. We find,
however, evidence that bilateral Sino-US meetings have a significant effect in increasing
the conditional volatility of the 12-month NDF rate. We also find that various domestic
macroeconomic surprise news affect significantly the NDF rate but not the central parity
rate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the RMB
exchange rate policy and political pressure indicators as well as the control variables are
discussed in section 3. Section 4 specifies the empirical model. Section 5 interprets
the findings. Section 6 discusses the potential issues encountered in interpreting the
empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The RMB exchange rate
2.1 Reforms and changes to the renminbi exchange rate system
On the 21st of July 2005, the Peoples Bank of China (PBC) announced a number of
measures to reform the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate regime. On the same day, the
currency was re-valued by 2.1% from 8.28 CNY per USD to 8.11. Perhaps the significance
of the July reform is that the peg to the USD was replaced by a “managed float” regime,
with the exchange rate determined with reference to a basket of currencies. By means of
these reforms, the Chinese monetary authority has gained a new policy tool to manage
its economy.
Every day, the PBC sets a new reference trading spot rate, the central parity rate,
for the RMB exchange rate against the US dollar. Before the 4th of January 2006, the
central parity rate was announced by the PBC at the market close on each of the 5
days trading week and the announced rate was used for trading in the following business
day. One problem with this procedure was the lack of information on how the PBC
determined the closing price. This is partly because the transactions were carried out
using an automatic price matching system, with the China Foreign Exchange Trade
System (CFETS) as the sole counterpart to all market participants. Furthermore, it
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seemed that the central parity rate at market close did not match well the next day’s
opening rate. This mechanism was ill-suited to lead to a market-driven foreign exchange
rate system.2
Since the 4th of January 2006, a “more market driven” price mechanism was in-
troduce to set the central parity rate. Three distinct features of the mechanism are
worth mentioning. First, over-the-counter (OTC) trading was introduced to the inter-
bank foreign exchange market. The OTC system refers to transactions between pairs of
accredited market participants via independent bilateral price inquiries and settlements.
In the early days of the OTC operations, the automatic price matching system was main-
tained to facilitate credit authorisation for small and medium sized financial institutions
and it has gradually been phased out. Secondly, on the 4th of January 2006, the PBC
authorised the CFETS to announce the central parity rate of the CNY against the US
dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the Hong Kong dollar at 9:15 am Beijing time of
each business day. Thirdly, the price formation mechanism of the central parity rate was
changed substantially. Before the market opens, the CFETS first inquires about prices
to all nominated market participants in the OTC system. Based on the information, the
highest and lowest offers are excluded and a weighted average of the remaining prices is
set as the central parity rate. The weights are determined by the CFETS according to
the previous days transaction volumes of each market participants. In addition, other
indicators such as the quoted prices from the automatic price matching system may also
be used as a reference. Once the central parity rate is determined against the US dollar,
the exchange rate is be set against the euro, the yen, and the Hong Kong dollar based
on the cross rates of these currencies with the US dollar.
There were two further changes to the RMB exchange rate regime. (1) Initially
the intra-day fluctuation of the RMB exchange rate against the US dollar was within a
tightly controlled range of ±0.3%. The band was subsequently widened to ±0.5% on the
18th of May 2007. (2) As a result of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the appreciation
RMB exchange rate against the US dollar was temporarily halted towards the end of
July 2008. On the 19th of June 2010, the China ended its almost 2 years long peg to the
US dollar during which the RMB exchange rate had on average been 6.831 to the US
dollar with a standard deviation of 0.007.3 During this 23 months period the Chinese
authorities had prevented the RMB from appreciating in order to help exporters cope
with declining demand triggered by the crisis.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis over two sample periods: 22nd of
July 2005 - 31th of May 2011 and 4th of January 2006 - 31st of July 2008. For notational
convenience, the samples are denoted as 2005 - 2011 and 2006 - 2008 respectively. The
first sample period contains all available information minus the period spanning from the
1st of August 2008 until the 19th of June 2010. As discussed above, the RMB exchange
rate exhibited virtually no movement during these 23 months, which makes testing for
2“Spokesperson of the People’s Bank of China Answers Questions on Further Improving Interbank
Spot Foreign Exchange Market” on the 3rd of January 2006, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
publish/english/955/2007/20071/20071_.html
3“China Signals End to Yuans 23-Month Peg Before G-20” (source: Bloomberg)
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the impact of political pressure on the RMB redundant over this period. Hence, this time
span is cut out of the sample. The presence of the above mentioned changes and reforms
to the RMB exchange rate is accommodated by introducing three dummy variables,
which equate 1 on and after the date of the reform/change and 0 prior to the date.
The “Reform (2006)” dummy variable accounts for the January 2006 reform; “Wider
Band (2007)” captures the widening of the trading band for the RMB on the 18th of
May 2007; and thirdly the variable “GFC (2010)” mends the July 2005 - August 2008
sample with the post 19th of June 2010 - 30th of May 2011 sample period. The second
sample provides a time span during which there were no major change or reform to
the RMB exchange rate system unlike the former period, except for the introduction of
wider trading bands in 2007. This sample is used a robustness check.
2.2 Expectations and the forward exchange rate
While the government-controlled central parity rate provides an interesting avenue to
analyse the effect of external political pressures on the RMB exchange rate, it is also
useful to compare it with a purely market-driven offshore exchange rate. The RMB
non-deliverable forward rate (NDF) is a natural candidate for this exercise.
The NDF rate is the closest available proxy to market expectations of the spot ex-
change. Unlike the central parity rate, participation in the NDF market is not limited to
nominated Chinese institutions only. It is opened to all interested market participants,
especially those multinational corporations with RMB exposures. Hence, it is purely
market driven. The RMB NDF contracts are similar to forward foreign exchange trans-
actions where a principal amount, a forward rate, and a maturity date are included in
the contract. Unlike a typical forward rate, the settlements for the RMB NDF rate are
usually made in USD at the time of maturity to reflect the difference between the agreed
forward rate and the actual spot rate.4 The NDF markets for the RMB are highly liquid
and active in Hong Kong and Singapore.
We present the results for the 12-month NDF rates in the Hong Kong market. Similar
to other currency markets, the NDF markets are opened 24 hours a day. The reference
rates are usually measured by Bloomberg at the end of the trading day of three different
time zones: Tokyo (at 20:00 hours), London (at 18:00 hours), and New York (at 17:00
hours). We use Tokyo’s time zone and on a 5 trading day basis, since it is the closest
to Beijing time, and hence coincide with the Chinese trading times. Finally, the RMB
NDF is analysed for the same two sample periods as the central parity rate discussed in
section 2.1.
4See Fung et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion of the NDF market.
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3 Political pressure indicators and control variables
3.1 Defining and coding political pressure
The political pressure indicators are constructed by collecting daily financial news per-
taining to the renminbi exchange rate policy following this simple rule:
Ift =
{
1 if statements by officials and/or institutions
0 otherwise
where Ift is a daily indicator function at time t from entity f for a 5 days trading week.
Specifically, Ift = 1 indicates there is a public statement calling for faster renminbi ap-
preciation from a foreign entity or multiple foreign entities. If Ift = 0, there is no event
related to the RMB exchange rate. The source of political pressure is from public state-
ments on Chinese exchange rate policy from the United States, the European Union,
Japan, and major international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund,
the G7 group, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development. We construct 5 main political pressure indicators from
theses sources, including an overall political pressure indicator aggregating all sources.
The overall political pressure indicator is subdivided into a US indicator and an ag-
gregated non-US indicator. The non-US variable combines the pressures coming from
the EU (and its member countries), Japan and international organisations.5 Moreover,
the US political pressure indicator is further split into an indicator for official bilateral
Sino-US meeting weeks and another for the remaining US political statements on the
RMB exchange rate policy. This is because the US is the most common source of po-
litical pressures calling for faster appreciation of the RMB exchange rate, and Chinese
reactions to pressures originating in the United States from senators for example, might
differ from pressures arising from scheduled official bilateral meetings. Table 1 shows
the number of political statements contained in each of the indicator.
The political pressure indicators are constructed by collating daily news headlines
concerning the renminbi exchange rate from the Bloomberg and Reuters news database
for the period between the 22nd of July 2005 and the 30th of May 2011. We select
daily news from these database that include keywords such as “RMB appreciation” and
“RMB exchange rate flexibility”. Strictly speaking, currency appreciation and flexibility
(i.e. the degree of movement of the exchange rate as permitted by the currency system)
are two distinct economic concepts. However, we classify any comments containing
the phrase “flexibility” as carrying the same meaning as a faster or larger appreciation
because of the backdrop of persistent international pressures for a faster renminbi appre-
ciation during our sample period. In some cases, there are multiple comments calling for
faster RMB appreciation from more than one source. Although this constitutes different
entries for the specific indicators concerned, the multiple comments are coded as one
entry when aggregated. This rule applies, for example, if there is political pressure from
a US Congress bill and an announcement made by the US Treasury on the same day.
5Each of these entities has few data points on its own compared to the US, which is problematic when
identifying parameters in the conditional volatility equation.
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Table 1: Number of statements by political pressure indicator
Indicator July 2005 - May 2011 Jan 2006 - July 2008
5 main indicators
Overall 268 194
US 213 150
Sino-US 80 55
US− 179 123
Non-US 81 62
Disaggregated non-US indicators
EU 42 35
Japan 7 6
Int’l Org 36 25
Notes: US− is the US political pressure indicator minus the bilateral Sino-US meetings. The Non-
US variable contains the political pressure from EU member states, Japan and major international
organisations. The Sino-US variable includes bilateral US-China meetings such as SED or JCCT. The
first sample spans from the 22nd of July 2005 until the 30th of May 2011 and the second sample spans
from the 4th of January 2006 until the 31st of July 2008.
The US pressure indicator includes statements from the executive branch of the US
government, including the US Treasury and the Presidency, and also from the Federal
Reserve and the US Congress, including hearings or proposed bills pertaining to the
Chinese RMB exchange rate. We collected all Congress bills containing the keywords
“currency” and “exchange rate” in their titles or summaries that were introduced in
the span of our sample period, i.e. during the 109th (2005-2006), 110th (2007-2008),
111th (2009-2010) and 112th Congresses.6 We the retained only the bills pertaining to
the RMB exchange rate explicitly, for example bills demanding the US government to
take actions against China for manipulating its currency, and bills related to the RMB
exchange rate, for example requiring Congress to clarify the conditions under which a
currency may be considered to be “misaligned.” Bills that are specifically targeted on
other currencies such as the Japanese yen were excluded. We quantify all these bills
equally so as to avoid judging the political strength of each bill arbitrarily.
The US and China have engaged in various bilateral meetings with each other on
the RMB exchange rate and trade related issues. Such meetings include the Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED), the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and
official visits by key government representatives, such the US Treasury Secretary and
the Vice-Premier of China. All of these bilateral meetings are accounted for in the
US political pressure indicator. Furthermore, we also create a Sino-US meeting week
indicator in order to track whether these bilateral meetings affect the RMB exchange
rate. Though the meetings usually last for 2 - 3 days, the Sino-US meetings indicator
takes the value of “1” for the whole week of the official meeting to account for the
anticipation and aftermath of the meetings.
The aggregated Non-US political pressure indicator include political statements from
Japan, the EU and international organisations. Political statement from Japan on the
6http://www.gpoaccess.gov/index.html
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RMB exchange rate are typically issued by the the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Political pressure for a faster appreciation
of the RMB also come from the European Central Bank and ministers (or presidents) of
EU member countries. Furthermore, spokespersons from the IMF, ABD or OECD often
comment on the need to appreciate the RMB further. A complete list of these indicators
and their sources is available from the authors upon request.7
3.2 Is weighting political pressure equally too restrictive?
One may wonder whether our findings could suffer from treating all political pressure
events equally when quantifying the external political pressure indicators. One way to
check this is to see whether there exists a systematic pattern in large daily RMB changes
that is consistent with news that bears more important implications than others for the
RMB exchange rate. These significant news events could include US congressional bills
that may have tangible impact on the Sino-US economic relations, US-China meetings
with a focus on the RMB exchange rate, or concerns on the RMB voiced by top EU
officials. We therefore present Table 2 that lists the 10 largest daily appreciations of the
RMB central parity rate, together with their corresponding news in the week over the
period spanning from the 22nd of July 2005 until the 30th of May 2011. It is interesting
to notice that these large appreciations are associated with events that come mostly, but
not exclusively, from the US. This is not surprising as there are 2.6 times more political
statements coming from the US compared to non-US news. The table also shows that
the US political pressure comes from various US sources including the Treasury, the
Department of State, the President and the Congress. It is, hence, difficult to discern
from these 10 largest appreciations days that the central parity rate would be consistently
set in a way that reflects any specific source of events dominating over another one.
7The data used in this paper is available at: http://sydney.edu.au/business/ome/research/
working_papers
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Table 2: 10 largest daily appreciations - RMB CPR (July 2005 - May 2011)
Date Day CPR %dod External pressure during the week
12/06/07 Tue 7.6475 -0.405 Senator Baucus introduced bill S.1607 on currency mis-
alignment
24/12/07 Mon 7.3315 -0.350 US Tsy doesn’t name China as currency manipulator;
US lawmakers vow action on China after report
28/02/08 Thu 7.1209 -0.345 Hu Jintao Meets with U.S. Secretary of State Rice
10/07/07 Tue 7.5845 -0.316 U.S. Rice said China could play fairer on trade, yuan
25/01/08 Fri 7.2065 -0.316 U.S. Push for Higher Yuan “Working”, McCormick Says
19/03/08 Wed 7.0648 -0.314 China Faces U.S. & European Pressure to Push Up Cur-
rency Faster
11/11/10 Thu 6.6242 -0.314 Geithner Says China Needs to Let Yuan Rise More;
Obama Presses Hu on Yuan’s Value as Trade Imbalances
Divide G-20; Greenspan Says U.S., China Currency Poli-
cies Risk Protectionism; EU Says It Understands China
Desire for Gradual Yuan Gains
3/01/08 Thu 7.2775 -0.303 No reported external pressure
8/11/07 Thu 7.4251 -0.303 France’s Sarkozy said he shared US concern over yuan’s
rate
25/06/10 Fri 6.7896 -0.300 Schumer Says U.S. Currency Legislation Will Move
“shortly”
Notes: This table shows the reported external pressures within the weeks prior to the days with the
largest daily changes (%dod) in the central parity rate (CPR). For the large changes in the CPR taking
place on a Monday, all the events that occurred on the previous Friday and during the weekend are
taken into consideration. Events that happened after the CPR appreciation are not included, except for
important and anticipated events such as the Strategic Economic Dialogue.
We arrive at a similar conclusion for the same experiment conducted on the 12-month
RMB NDF rate. Table 3 show that there is little evidence supporting patterns of more
significant news affecting the 12-month NDF rate. In fact, five out of the ten largest
appreciations have no events associated with them.
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Table 3: 10 largest daily appreciations - 12-month RMB NDF (July 2005 - May 2011)
Date Day NDF %dod External pressure during the week
11/06/08 Wed 6.5770 -1.096 Paulson Urges China to Let Yuan Rise
16/06/08 Mon 6.4910 -0.974 Treasury’s Holmer Says China’s Yuan Appreciation Is
“Welcome”
21/05/08 Wed 6.5080 -0.971 Paulson Declines to Call China a Currency Manipulator
20/06/08 Fri 6.4515 -0.903 Paulson Urges More Flexibility in China’s Currency
7/03/08 Fri 6.3330 -0.854 No reported external pressure
24/03/09 Tue 6.7888 -0.846 No reported external pressure
6/03/08 Thu 6.3873 -0.767 No reported external pressure
9/11/07 Fri 6.8765 -0.732 No reported external pressure
14/01/08 Mon 6.6155 -0.715 No reported external pressure
13/03/08 Thu 6.2775 -0.691 Kimmitt Says China Must Allow “Significant” Yuan Ap-
preciation
Notes: This table shows the reported external pressures within the weeks prior to the days with the
largest daily changes (%dod) in the 12-Month RMB Non-Deliverable Forward rate (NDF). If the large
changes in the 12-month NDF takes place on a Monday, all the events that occurred on the previous
Friday up to the Monday 1900 hours (Tokyo time) are taken into consideration. Events that happened
after the NDF appreciation are not included, except for important and anticipated events such as the
Strategic Economic Dialogue.
3.3 Macroeconomic control variables
The use of monthly macroeconomic news and indices as exogenous control variables in
exchange rate intervention models are common in the literature (see Neely, 2005). We
control for the effect of various China specific macroeconomic news surprises about the
state of monetary conditions, economic activity, and external imbalances. Because the
foreign exchange rate market is forward looking, changes in macroeconomic conditions
are anticipated by the market and should not have much influence on daily exchange
rate movements. Only unanticipated changes in the economic condition should. These
unanticipated macroeconomic changes are referred to as macroeconomic news surprises
and are measured as the difference between the official data on its release date (real-time
data) and its corresponding median market forecasts that reflect market expectations.8
The median market forecasts are obtained from Bloomberg, which conducts regular
surveys of financial institutions both in China and abroad every month before the official
data releases of these monthly indicators.
We use the loan growth and M2 growth surprises, as well as the interest rate dif-
ferential between the US and China to control for China’s monetary conditions.9 The
interest rate differential attempts to reflect the interest rate parity condition. The in-
terest rate differential data is calculated using the daily money market interest rates in
8In some occurrences, the data were announced before its official release date by news media quoting
ad-hoc sources. The numbers quoted, however, do not always match the official numbers released. For
consistency, we only rely on the data released on the official statistic release date.
9Market forecasts for loans growth are only available from 2007 onwards. We therefore use month on
month changes in loan growth as a proxy for the loan growth surprises.
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the United States (one-month LIBOR) and in China (one-month CHIBOR), collected
from Bloomberg. Surprises in CPI inflation, growth in fixed asset investment (FAI), and
growth in industrial production (IP) control for the effect of economic activities. The
effect of external balances on the RMB exchange is accounted for by surprises in the
monthly changes of Chinas trade surplus (TB).
4 Methodology and model specification
We adopt an event study methodology to examine whether political pressure calling for
faster RMB appreciation has a statistically significant impact on both the return of the
RMB exchange rate and its conditional volatility. As discussed in Neely (2005), an event
study requires events to be defined along with appropriate criteria and methodology
to test their impact. In the present case, events are news reports related to political
pressure as defined in section 3. The hypothesis that political pressure affects the RMB
exchange rate is tested using two criteria: (1) the direction or sign of the coefficient on
the political pressure indicator and (2) its statistical significance. The direction or sign
is a commonly used criterion in the foreign exchange intervention literature and discerns
an intervention as a successful if the purchased currency appreciates the exchange rate
and vice versa (see Humpage (2000) for details). Furthermore, political pressure can
be considered successful if it has a statistically significant impact on the appreciation
of the RMB exchange rate. Following the existing foreign exchange literature, we use a
GARCH(1,1) model to test the proposed hypothesis.
First, we are interested in investigating the effect of external pressure on the daily
returns of the RMB exchange rate. The model used to test such effects is specified as
follows:
rCNYt = ζ +ψx
macro
t−1 + θI
f
t−1 + δdt−1 + εt (1)
where rCNYt = ln
(
SCNYt /S
CNY
t−1
)×100, SCNYt is CNY/USD central parity exchange rate.
xmacrot−1 is a k × 1 vector of macroeconomic news surprises pertinent to the conditions of
monetary policy, economic activity, and external imbalances in China; Ift−1 is a l × 1
vector that contains various specifications of the political pressure indicators and dt−1
is a vector of dummies tracking the reforms to the RMB exchange rate. The control
variables, the pressure indicators and dummy variables are dated at t− 1 as the central
parity rate is set every morning before the trading day. A negative coefficient would
indicate that political pressure lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
Next, we investigate the impact of foreign pressure on conditional volatility of the
central parity rate. This is conducted by using a conditional volatility model in the spirit
of Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). Following Neely (2005), we use a GARCH(1,1)
model specification and the pressure indicators are also introduced in the conditional
variance equation. The shocks to returns εt are given by:
εt = ηt
√
ht, ηt ∼ iid(0, 1) (2)
ht = ω + αε2t−1 + βht−1 + γI
f
t−1 (3)
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ω > 0, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 are sufficient conditions to ensure a strictly positive conditional
variance, ht > 0. The ARCH effect, α , captures the short run persistence of shocks,
and the GARCH effect, β, indicates the contribution of shocks to long run persistence,
α + β. The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the second moment
of εt for the GARCH(1,1) model is α + β < 1 (for further details see, for example, Li
et al. (2002)). A positive and significant coefficient on foreign pressure indicator would
imply that political pressure tend to increase the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD
exchange rate. Note also that for the 2005 - 2011 sample, the variance equation (3) is
augmented with an indicator variable st,
ht = ω + αε2t−1 + βht−1 + γI
f
t−1 + φst (4)
where st = 1 for t = 22nd of June 2010 and st = 0 everywhere else. This variable
produces a spike to account for the fact that two samples are mended (see section 2.1),
and is not reported in the empirical results.
The empirical exercise is repeated for the return of the 12-months RMB NDF rate,
rNDFt , which is modelled similarly to equation (1)
rNDFt = ζ +ψx
macro
t + θI
f
t−1 + δdt−1 + ρr
ANDF
t−1 + εt (5)
where rANDFt−1 is a 9× 1 vector of 12-month NDF returns for 9 Asian countries including
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Fillipines and
Thailand. Colavecchio and Funke (2008, 2009) show that the Asian NDF markets,
including the RMB NDF, exhibit strong co-movements. Hence, we control for such co-
movements by including these 9 Asian NDF returns. The variance equations, however,
are the same as equations (2), (3) and (4). Note that macroeconomic control variables
are dated at time t, as the RMB NDF 12-month rate is measured at the end of every
trading day (5 days week) and macroeconomic announcements occur throughout the
trading day. Furthermore, the non-US political pressure indicator is slightly re-adjusted
to account for the fact that Japanese announcements are contemporary to the RMB
NDF trading.
The econometric difficulties associated with traditional event studies such as simul-
taneity and identification are less of a problem here. Contrary to foreign exchange inter-
ventions that occur simultaneously to the changes in the exchange rate, political pressure
occur before the central parity rate is set, given the time difference. Furthermore, foreign
exchange interventions are initiated as part of a domestic policy vis-a-vis the exchange
rate and often as a reaction to its movements at the time of the intervention. External
political pressure, on the other hand, arise from abroad as an attempt to impact the
long-term domestic policy on exchange rate. Hence, foreign pressures should be exoge-
nous to both the daily returns of central parity rate and the RMB NDF. We deal with
potential identification problem by using macroeconomic surprises news, constructed as
the deviation from market expectations surveyed among market participants. This im-
plies that the macroeconomic surprises should be orthogonal to the external political
pressure indicators.
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5 Empirical results
5.1 The effect of external political pressures on the central parity rate
This section presents the estimation results and discusses whether external political
pressure affect the daily returns and the conditional variance of the RMB central parity
rate. Moreover, it also investigates whether bilateral Sino-US meetings on trade and
currency issues, including the Sino-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), have any
notable influence on the RMB exchange rate, as compared with other types of political
pressure. We compare the mean and variance equations in two sample periods: 22nd of
July 2005 - 30th of May 2011 and 4th of January 2006 - 31st of July 2008, in tables 4
and 5 respectively. The maximum-likelihood estimation is conducted using the BHHH
maximisation algorithm (Berndt et al., 1974). All standard errors are computed from the
heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix as proposed by White (1992)
and also by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) for volatility models.
First, we turn to the mean equation in Table 4. The sign of coefficient of the overall
political pressure indicator is negative, which indicates that political pressure leads to
an appreciation of the exchange rate as expected. However, the coefficient of this vari-
able is not statistically significant. Political pressure indicators from the US and non-US
sources have the expected negative effect but are never statistically significant. The coef-
ficient for the Sino-US meeting week indicator is negative and statistically insignificant,
suggesting that pressure from bilateral meetings tend to appreciate the central parity
rate. These findings also hold when we examine the Sino-US meeting indicator alone
without including the other pressure indicators (Column 5). Similarly, when excluding
the meeting weeks, the coefficient of the US pressure indicator has a negative sign on
the daily returns of the central parity rate, but is not statistically significant (Column
6).10 Such findings suggest that external political pressure does not appear to have any
significant influence on the daily returns of the CNY/USD. Furthermore, Table 5 shows
that these results are consistent across both sets of sample periods.
As seen both in tables 4 and 5, none of the domestic macroeconomic surprise news
pertaining to the monetary conditions (financial institutional loan and M2), economic
conditions (CPI, FAI and IP) and external imbalances (trade surplus) is statistically
significant. Unlike most foreign exchange markets in industrialised economies, which
react strongly to macroeconomic surprise news, the central parity rate of CNY/USD
market does not seem to be driven by fundamentals. This is in part expected because
participation in the spot market is limited to a few traders authorised by the Chinese
authorities. We see in section 5.2 that this result no longer holds when looking at the
non-deliverable forward market. However, only the interest rate differential variable
shows some statistical significant at the 10% level for the sample spanning from 2005 -
2011 and at the 5% level for the sample period extending from 2006 - 2008. The sign
of the coefficient of the interest rate differential variable is always positive. Given that
the variable is measured as one-month LIBOR minus one-month CHIBOR, the positive
10Note that Columns 4 to 6 of tables 4 and 5 are robustness checks that intend to exhaust all the
variants of US pressures.
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coefficient implies that the larger the interest rate differential, the larger the depreciation
of the CNY/USD exchange rate. Nevertheless, one needs to be careful in interpreting
this finding as the interest differential has been increasing continuously throughout the
sample period.
The results suggest that the widening of the trade band of the RMB exchange rate on
the 18th of May 2007 did not affect significantly the daily changes of the RMB exchange
in either sample period. In addition, both Reform (2006), accounting for the effect of
the pricing mechanism change on the 4th of January 2006, and GFC (2010), mending
the July 2005 - August 2008 sample with the post 19th of June 2010 - 30th of May 2011
sample, seem to have a statistically significant impact. Hence, accounting for the reform
to the RMB appears to be important in all specifications of the model.
Second, we turn to the variance equation. Contrary to the mean regression, we find
that the overall external political pressure indicator has a statistically significant and
positive effect on the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate at the 5% level
of significance (see variance equation in tables 4 and 5). Furthermore, the effect of the US
political pressure indicator on the conditional volatility of the RMB central parity rate’s
returns is always positive and statistically significant regardless of the sample period.
The positive sign indicates that the external political pressure increases the conditional
volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate. The non-US political pressure indicator,
however, has a mitigated statistical effect across sample specification (Column 2 and 3).
The non-US indicator does seem to have a positive and statistically significant effect
on the conditional volatility, but this result does not hold when looking at the 2005 -
2011 extended sample. The coefficient for the Sino-US meeting week is negative and
significant in influencing the conditional volatility at the 5% significance level in the
2006 - 2008 sample, suggesting that the conditional volatility actually declines during
the meeting weeks on average. Similarly to the non-US political pressure, we find that
the results are not robust when focusing on the 2005 - 2011 sample (table 4), however.
Lastly, we report three statistics to assess the overall level of performance across
models, namely AIC, BIC and the log-likelihood (LogL) model selection criteria reported
at the bottom of tables 4 and 5. In the 2005 - 2011 sample, the BIC selects model (2)
whereas the AIC and LogL pick model (6) as having the best overall fit. Both models
feature the US political pressure indicator. Although the selection criteria do not directly
agree, the AIC and LogL’s second pick is model (2) and the BIC criterion’s second pick
is model (6). On the other hand, all three criteria agree and select the parsimonious
model (1) for the 2006 - 2008 sample, indicating that the model with overall political
pressure performs best.
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Table 4: GARCH(1,1) models for daily RMB Central Parity Rate returns (July 2005 - May 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean equation
Intercept -0.013** (0.006) -0.013** (0.006) -0.012** (0.005) -0.014** (0.006) -0.015** (0.006) -0.013** (0.006)
Macro news:
Loan growth 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004)
FAI growth 0.010 (0.013) 0.011 (0.014) 0.014 (0.014) 0.013 (0.014) 0.011 (0.014) 0.011 (0.014)
CPI inflation 0.008 (0.037) 0.004 (0.037) 0.011 (0.036) 0.009 (0.038) 0.004 (0.038) 0.006 (0.037)
IP growth -0.011 (0.007) -0.010 (0.007) -0.012 (0.008) -0.012 (0.008) -0.014* (0.007) -0.011 (0.007)
M2 growth 0.008 (0.009) 0.008 (0.008) 0.007 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) 0.008 (0.009) 0.009 (0.008)
Trade bal. -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Interest rate diff. 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.005** (0.003) 0.004* (0.002)
Reform (2006) -0.008* (0.004) -0.008** (0.004) -0.008** (0.004) -0.008** (0.004) -0.008** (0.004) -0.008** (0.004)
Wider band (2007) -0.014 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) -0.013 (0.009) -0.012 (0.009) -0.015 (0.009)
GFC (2010) 0.031** (0.013) 0.031** (0.013) 0.029** (0.013) 0.033** (0.013) 0.036** (0.013) 0.031** (0.013)
Political pressure:
Overall -0.003 (0.004)
US/US− -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005)
Non-US -0.008 (0.007) -0.008 (0.007)
Sino-US -0.006 (0.007) -0.007 (0.006) -0.008 (0.0056)
Variance equation
Intercept -0.00004** (##) -0.00002** (##) -0.00005** (##) -0.00003** (##) 0.00001** (0.000) -0.00003** (##)
ARCH term 0.075** (0.017) 0.057** (0.016) 0.073** (0.016) 0.0759** (0.017) 0.093** (0.020) 0.058** (0.015)
GARCH term 0.926** (0.015) 0.945** (0.014) 0.930** (0.015) 0.9271** (0.015) 0.913** (0.018) 0.945** (0.013)
Political pressure:
Overall 0.0002** (##)
US/US− 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0003** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001)
Non-US -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002)
Sino-US -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0001* (0.0001) -0.0001 (##)
AIC -2.31 -2.32 -2.31 -2.31 -2.30 -2.33
BIC -2.23 -2.30 -2.21 -2.16 -2.22 -2.24
LogL 1211.89 1220.21 1214.91 1212.75 1208.61 1220.35
Notes: * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% or more respectively. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than
0.00005. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. US− is the US political pressure indicator minus the bilateral
Sino-US meetings when the regression contains the separate variable Sino-US variable. The Non-US variable contains the political pressure from EU
member states, Japan and international organisations. The Sino-US variable includes bilateral US-China meetings such as SED or JCCT. Macro
news are computed as the deviation of real-time released data and median market expectations. The models estimated follow the specification in
equations (1), (2) and (4). All models are estimated using the BHHH maximization algorithm.
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Table 5: GARCH(1,1) models for daily RMB Central Parity Rate returns (January 2006 - July 2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean equation
Intercept -0.028** (0.009) -0.025** (0.009) -0.028** (0.009) -0.030** (0.009) -0.031** (0.009) -0.029** (0.009)
Macro news:
Loan growth 0.011 (0.023) 0.018 (0.030) 0.018 (0.030) 0.016 (0.027) 0.018 (0.029) 0.019 (0.028)
FAI growth 0.015 (0.015) 0.015 (0.015) 0.022 (0.015) 0.023 (0.014) 0.021 (0.014) 0.015 (0.014)
CPI inflation -0.007 (0.053) -0.015 (0.051) -0.010 (0.050) 0.001 (0.051) -0.007 (0.050) -0.007 (0.053)
IP growth -0.002 (0.011) -0.003 (0.010) -0.005 (0.009) -0.006 (0.009) -0.005 (0.009) -0.002 (0.010)
M2 growth 0.016 (0.015) 0.011 (0.019) 0.011 (0.020) 0.012 (0.017) 0.010 (0.017) 0.011 (0.017)
Trade bal. -0.004 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003)
Interest rate diff. 0.007** (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 0.008** (0.003) 0.008** (0.004) 0.007** (0.003)
Wider band (2007) -0.008 (0.011) -0.008 (0.010) -0.005 (0.011) -0.006 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011) -0.007 (0.011)
Political pressure:
Overall -0.006 (0.006)
US/US− -0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006)
Non-US -0.016 (0.011) -0.015 (0.011)
Sino-US -0.015 (0.013) -0.014 (0.012) -0.016 (0.012)
Variance equation
Intercept -0.00002** (##) -0.00011** (##) -0.00011** (##) -0.00007** (##) 0.00004** (##) -0.00008** (##)
ARCH term 0.032** (0.012) 0.093** (0.025) 0.100** (0.023) 0.071** (0.020) 0.081** (0.023) 0.069** (0.021)
GARCH term 0.965** (0.012) 0.905** (0.025) 0.908** (0.023) 0.940** (0.017) 0.927** (0.021) 0.936** (0.020)
Political pressure:
Overall 0.0002** (0.0001)
US/US− 0.0004** (0.0002) 0.0005** (0.0002) 0.0004** (0.0002) 0.0005** (0.0002)
Non-US 0.0011** (0.0004) 0.0009** (0.0004)
Sino-US -0.0006** (0.0003) -0.0006** (0.0002) -0.0006** (0.0002)
AIC -2.12 -2.09 -2.09 -2.10 -2.10 -2.10
BIC -2.02 -1.98 -1.97 -1.99 -2.00 -2.00
LogL 727.08 719.07 721.11 724.00 720.51 720.89
Notes: * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% or more, respectively. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than
0.00005. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. US− is the US political pressure indicator minus the bilateral
Sino-US meetings when the regression contains the separate variable Sino-US variable. The Non-US variable contains the political pressure from EU
member states, Japan and international organisations. The Sino-US variable includes bilateral US-China meetings such as SED or JCCT. Macro
news are computed as the deviation of real-time released data and median market expectations. The models estimated follow the specification in
equations (1), (2) and (3). All models are estimated using the BHHH maximization algorithm.
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5.2 Do external political pressures affect the renminbi NDF rates?
This section presents the empirical results and discusses whether external political pres-
sure, including bilateral Sino-US meetings, affect the daily returns and the conditional
variance of the 12-months RMB non-deliverable forward. We compare the mean and
variance equations in the same two sample periods: 2005 - 2011 and 2006 - 2008, in ta-
bles 6 and 7 respectively. The maximum-likelihood estimation and the standard errors
are computed in the same way as in section 5.1.
First, we turn to the mean equation in tables 6 and 7. Both the overall and US
political pressure indicator do not appear to have any statistically significant influence on
the daily returns of the NDF rate. The sign of coefficient of the overall pressure indicator
and the US pressure indicator is negative for the 12-month NDF rate, indicating that
external pressure leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate. These findings are quite
consistent with the central parity results and are consistent across sample specification.
However, Non-US political pressures seem to have some effect on the 12-month NDF
rate for the sample 2005 - 2011, at the 10% and 5% level of significance depending on
the model specification. Note that this result is, however, not robust to changes when
looking at the sample 2006 - 2008.
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Table 6: GARCH(1,1) models for daily RMB 12-Month Non Deliverable Forward returns (July 2005 - May 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean equation
Intercept -0.027 (0.021) -0.027 (0.020) -0.030 (0.018) -0.032 (0.017) -0.033 (0.018) -0.026 (0.021)
Macro news:
Loan growth 0.008 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008) 0.008 (0.008)
FAI growth -0.005 (0.017) -0.004 (0.017) -0.006 (0.018) -0.008 (0.019) -0.006 (0.018) -0.008 (0.017)
CPI inflation -0.131** (0.058) -0.134** (0.059) -0.133** (0.060) -0.131** (0.064) -0.131** (0.061) -0.131** (0.061)
IP growth -0.032** (0.016) -0.033** (0.016) -0.034** (0.015) -0.032** (0.015) -0.033** (0.015) -0.033** (0.016)
M2 growth 0.018 (0.042) 0.018 (0.042) 0.035 (0.035) 0.034 (0.032) 0.031 (0.036) 0.018 (0.041)
Trade bal. -0.009* (0.005) -0.009* (0.005) -0.010** (0.004) -0.010** (0.004) -0.010** (0.004) -0.009** (0.005)
Interest rate diff. 0.014** (0.006) 0.014** (0.006) 0.013** (0.006) 0.012** (0.006) 0.012** (0.006) 0.014** (0.006)
Reform (2006) -0.019 (0.019) -0.018 (0.017) -0.011 (0.014) -0.008 (0.014) -0.011 (0.015) -0.021 (0.019)
Wider trading (2007) 0.002 (0.016) 0.002 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.014 (0.016) -0.010 (0.017) 0.001 (0.016)
GFC (2010) 0.081** (0.032) 0.079** (0.031) 0.084** (0.031) 0.085** (0.031) 0.085** (0.031) 0.083** (0.031)
Political pressure:
Overall -0.013 (0.010)
US/US− -0.005 (0.011) -0.008 (0.011) -0.013 (0.011) -0.011 (0.012)
Non-US -0.033* (0.017) -0.037** (0.016)
Sino-US 0.017 (0.025) 0.017 (0.026) 0.015 (0.026)
Variance equation
Intercept -0.00005 (##) -0.00001 (0.0002) 0.00004 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) (##) (0.0001) 0.00008 (0.0001)
ARCH term 0.064 (0.016) 0.064 (0.017) 0.064 (0.015) 0.091 (0.017) 0.064 (0.015) 0.064 (0.016)
GARCH term 0.940 (0.014) 0.939 (0.015) 0.936 (0.013) 0.902 (0.014) 0.935 (0.013) 0.941 (0.014)
Political pressure:
Overall 0.0005 (##)
US/US− -0.00001 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.0006) -0.00003 (0.001)
Non-US 0.00126 (0.001) -0.0004 (0.001)
Sino-US 0.003** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 0.003** (0.001)
AIC -0.557 -0.556 -0.567 -0.550 -0.569 -0.555
BIC -0.433 -0.422 -0.424 -0.421 -0.445 -0.431
LogL 314.34 316.04 323.89 311.75 320.57 313.70
Notes: * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% or more, respectively. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than
0.00005. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. US− is the US political pressure indicator minus the bilateral
Sino-US meetings when the regression contains the separate variable Sino-US variable. The Non-US variable contains the political pressure from
EU member states, Japan and international organisations. The Sino-US variable includes bilateral US-China meetings such as SED or JCCT.
Macro news are computed as the deviation of real-time released data and median market expectations. We control for co-movements in 12-month
NDF returns for 9 Asian countries (see section 4). The models estimated follow the specification in equations (5), (2) and (4). All models are
estimated using the BHHH maximization algorithm.
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Table 7: GARCH(1,1) models for daily RMB 12-Month Non Deliverable Forward returns (January 2006 - July 2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean equation
Intercept -0.049 (0.018) -0.046 (0.018) -0.041 (0.018) -0.043 (0.018) -0.044 (0.018) -0.052 (0.019)
Macroeconomic news on
Loan growth -0.052 (0.035) -0.052 (0.037) -0.049 (0.036) -0.043 (0.036) -0.047 (0.037) -0.053 (0.037)
FAI growth 0.001 (0.017) 0.001 (0.016) 0.002 (0.017) 0.001 (0.018) 0.001 (0.018) -0.002 (0.016)
CPI inflation -0.155** (0.064) -0.162** (0.068) -0.158** (0.067) -0.154** (0.068) -0.157** (0.069) -0.149** (0.064)
IP growth -0.036** (0.013) -0.036** (0.013) -0.037** (0.012) -0.036** (0.013) -0.036** (0.013) -0.037** (0.014)
M2 growth 0.115** (0.030) 0.118** (0.031) 0.118** (0.031) 0.113** (0.031) 0.113** (0.031) 0.112** (0.029)
Trade bal. -0.011** (0.003) -0.011** (0.003) -0.011** (0.003) -0.011** (0.003) -0.011** (0.003) -0.011** (0.003)
Interest rate diff. 0.016** (0.007) 0.015** (0.007) 0.013** (0.007) 0.013** (0.007) 0.013** (0.007) 0.016** (0.007)
Wider band (2007) 0.005 (0.018) 0.003 (0.017) -0.005 (0.017) -0.005 (0.018) -0.006 (0.017) 0.006 (0.019)
Political pressure:
Overall -0.014 (0.011)
US/US− -0.006 (0.012) -0.010 (0.012) -0.011 (0.012) -0.010 (0.012)
Non-US -0.028 (0.019) -0.029 (0.012)
Sino-US 0.005 (0.024) 0.001 (0.024) 0.003 (0.024)
Variance equation
Intercept -0.00005 (0.0002) 0.00004 (0.0002) 0.00006 (0.0002) 0.00005 (##) 0.00002 (0.0001) 0.00004 (0.0001)
ARCH term 0.077 (0.021) 0.095 (0.024) 0.085 (0.021) 0.086 (0.021) 0.088 (0.021) 0.057 (0.020)
GARCH term 0.929 (0.019) 0.912 (0.019) 0.920 (0.017) 0.918 (0.017) 0.917 (0.016) 0.951 (0.019)
Political pressure:
Overall 0.0004 (0.001)
US/US− -0.00004 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.001) -0.0002 (0.001) -0.0001 (0.0006)
Non-US 0.0012 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001)
Sino-US 0.002* (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001)
AIC -0.637 -0.626 -0.629 -0.630 -0.635 -0.642
BIC -0.483 -0.458 -0.448 -0.463 -0.481 -0.488
LogL 237.80 235.92 238.94 237.43 236.90 239.19
Notes: * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% or more, respectively. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than
0.00005. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. US− is the US political pressure indicator minus the bilateral
Sino-US meetings when the regression contains the separate variable Sino-US variable. The Non-US variable contains the political pressure from
EU member states, Japan and international organisations. The Sino-US variable includes bilateral US-China meetings such as SED or JCCT.
Macro news are computed as the deviation of real-time released data and median market expectations. We control for co-movements in 12-month
NDF returns for 9 Asian countries (see section 4). The models estimated follow the specification in equations (5), (2) and (3). All models are
estimated using the BHHH maximization algorithm.
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Table 8 presents estimation results for an alternative sample spanning from January
2006 until May 2011, excluding the period previous to the RMB reform of the 4th of
January 2006. Again, the findings indicate that non-US political pressure does not affect
the returns of the RMB NDF rate, making the evidence found in table 6 even weaker.
Table 8: GARCH(1,1) models for daily RMB 12-Month NDF Returns (2006 - 2011)
(1) (2)
Intercept -0.049 (0.016) -0.050 (0.016)
Macro news
Loan growth 0.009 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008)
FAI growth -0.008 (0.017) -0.006 (0.017)
CPI inflation -0.133** (0.064) -0.134** (0.064)
IP growth -0.033** (0.016) -0.033** (0.016)
M2 growth 0.020 (0.043) 0.020 (0.044)
Trade bal. -0.009* (0.005) -0.009* (0.005)
Interest rate diff. 0.015** (0.006) 0.015** (0.006)
Reform (2006)
Wider band (2007) 0.001 (0.031) 0.002 (0.016)
GFC (2010) 0.089** (0.012) 0.088** (0.031)
Political pressure:
Overall
US/US− -0.006 (0.018) -0.001 (0.012)
Non-US -0.023 (0.024) -0.022 (0.018)
Sino-US 0.012 (##)
AIC -0.501 -0.501
BIC -0.364 -0.364
LogL 256.17 256.17
Notes: * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% or more, respectively. The sign
## indicates that the figure is smaller than 0.00005. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. US− is the US political pressure indicator minus the bilateral Sino-US meetings
when the regression contains the separate variable Sino-US variable. The Non-US variable contains the
political pressure from EU member states, Japan and international organisations. The Sino-US variable
includes bilateral US-China meetings such as SED or JCCT. Macro news are computed as the deviation
of real-time released data and median market expectations. We control for co-movements in 12-month
NDF returns for 9 Asian countries (see section 4). The models estimated follow the specification in
equations (5), (2) and (4). All models are estimated using the BHHH maximization algorithm.
Nevertheless, we also perform a robustness check using disaggregate indicator series com-
posing the non-US political pressure indicator (see Table 9). As the non-US indicator’s
significant effect is only found in the mean equation and the disaggregated series contain
few observations (see table 1), only the mean estimates are reproduced.11 We find that
the international organisations indicator affect statistically the RMB NDF rate at the
5% level. The international organisation indicator contains announcements mostly from
the International Monetary Fund. One possible reason for this result is that there are
11The variance equation is assumed to follow a GARCH(1,1) specification. The results are not pre-
sented here as they do provide further insights to the problem discussed.
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fewer announcements coming from the IMF, and hence the international organisation
indicator contains less noise than the US political pressure indicator for example.
Table 9: Disaggregated political pressure and the RMB NDF rate
Sample 2005-2011 2006-2008
Mean equation
Intercept -0.023 (0.021) -0.057 (0.020)
Macro news:
Loan growth 0.009 (0.008) -0.042 (0.034)
FAI growth 0.002 (0.018) 0.008 (0.018)
CPI inflation -0.134** (0.061) -0.159** (0.068)
IP growth -0.035** (0.016) -0.038** (0.013)
M2 growth 0.019 (0.042) 0.114** (0.029)
Trade bal. -0.009* (0.005) -0.011** (0.004)
Interest rate diff. 0.014** (0.006) 0.020** (0.007)
Reform (2006) -0.023 (0.019)
Wider band (2007) 0.003 (0.016) 0.008 (0.018)
GFC (2010) 0.080** (0.032)
Political pressure:
US -0.004 (0.011) -0.009 (0.012)
EU -0.030 (0.029) -0.012 (0.028)
JP 0.043 (0.027) 0.036 (0.030)
Int’l org -0.051** (0.022) -0.059** (0.026)
AIC -0.558 -0.636
BIC -0.424 -0.468
LogL 317.08 237.88
Notes: * and ** denotes statistical significance at the 10% and 5% or more, respectively. Bollerslev-
Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Macro news are computed as the de-
viation of real-time released data and median market expectations. We control for co-movements in
12-month NDF returns for 9 Asian countries (see section 4). The models estimated follow the specifica-
tion in equations (5), (2) and a simple GARCH(1,1) variance equation - constant, ARCH and GARCH
terms - which is not reported. All models are estimated using the BHHH maximization algorithm.
Contrary to the central parity rate, the RMB NDF rate is mostly driven by domestic
macroeconomic surprise news. The most important determinants of the NDF rate are
CPI inflation, industrial production growth (IP) and trade balance for both sample
periods. Broad money growth (M2) is also statistically significant. Both CPI inflation
and broad money growth have the largest impact on the RMB NDF rate in terms of
coefficient magnitude. Larger than expected growth in CPI, industrial production and
trade balance imply significant daily appreciation of the NDF rates. On the other hand,
surprises in broad money tend to induce depreciation. Moreover, as in the central parity
case, the interest rate differential is significant and positive, but of a larger magnitude.12
12As shown in equation 5, the mean equation includes 12-months NDF returns for 9 Asian countries
as control variables. The main purpose is to control for any co-movements between these NDF rates and
the RMB NDF rate. The results are available upon request.
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The RMB NDF results suggest that neither the widening of the trade band of the
RMB exchange rate on the 18th of May 2007 nor the 4th of January 2006 reform have a
statistically significant effect in either sample. However, the GFC (2010) seems to have
a statistically significant impact. These results are sensible as both Wider Band (2007)
and Reform (2006) are changes related to the internal trading mechanism of the RMB
central parity rate, whereas GFC (2010) accounts for the RMB’s halted appreciation
due to the Global Financial Crisis, which affected all markets.
Second, we turn to the variance equation. While the Sino-US meetings do not have
a statistically significant effect on the daily returns of the RMB NDF rate, they do
on its conditional volatility as seen in tables 6 and 7. This results suggest that the
conditional volatility rises in the RMB NDF market when there are official bilateral
meetings between China and the US. This result is robust across model and sample
specification. The direction of the impact is different from the results obtained for the
central parity rate, in which the volatility tends to decline. However, overall, US and
Non-US political pressures do not appear to induce higher or lower conditional volatility
unlike the results found for the central parity rate.
Next, we look at the three statistics to assess the overall level of performance across
models, reported at the bottom of tables 6 and 7. In the 2005 - 2011 sample, both
the AIC and the BIC pick model (5) whereas the LogL favours model (3). Both models
contain the Sino-US meetings indicator, which is consistent with its individual statistical
significance in the variance equation. In contrast, all three criteria agree and select model
(6) for the 2006 - 2008 sample, indicating that the model just with the US indicator
(minus Sino-US meetings) performs best. However, the LogL’s second pick is model (3)
as in the 2005 - 2011 sample, whereas AIC and BIC favour the parsimonious model (1)
which features the overall political pressure indicator.
In sum, most of the macroeconomic surprise news are statistically significant in the
NDF regressions, but not in the CPR regressions. This suggests that the offshore RMB
NDF is driven by market activities, whereas the CPR in the onshore market is not.
Although political pressure does not seem to affect either the CPR or the NDF in the
mean, it does have a statistically significant effect in the variance equation of the CPR
more than in the NDF. A reason for this is that the NDF traders are forward-looking and
take into account the onshore CPR momentum and trend. If the CPR does not show any
signs of yielding to political pressure, NDF traders may notice it and incorporate this
information when trading the NDF, thereby leaving the volatility in the NDF market
unaffected.
6 Do political pressures affect the RMB in the long run?
So far, this paper has shown that there is little evidence that external political pressure
has an effect on either the central parity rate or the NDF rate on a daily basis. Should
one therefore conclude that such political pressures do not influence either the authority
setting the CPR or the market participants in the NDF market? It is arguable that
the significant effect recorded on the conditional variance could itself be evidence that
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political pressure is effective by introducing market uncertainty and raising the proba-
bility of larger future CNY/USD appreciations. This evidence appears to be consistent
across specifications when investigating both the central parity rate and the NDF rate.
In the CPR case, US, non-US and Sino-US indicators have statistically significant ef-
fects, whereas in the NDF case only Sino-US meetings appear to have significant effects.
Nonetheless, this evidence is somewhat indirect, as political pressure does not seem to
affect directly daily returns of either the CPR or NDF in the first moment. It is also
worth noting that although volatility models provide an appropriate framework to anal-
yse the conditional volatility in high frequency data such as daily returns of exchange
rate, the effect of political pressure on the returns may be harder to capture with daily
data.
It can be argued that the success of political pressures in affecting the pace of the
RMB appreciation could be observed over a longer time horizon instead of on a day-
to-day basis. This could be because the exchange rate policy makers not only have
to consider foreign political pressure but also domestic policy concerns and domestic
pressure from exporters, for example. Hence, in some occasions, the controlled and
times daily CPR movements could be used as policy tool to counter foreign political
pressure. Unfortunately, it is not simple to demonstrate this point rigorously or within
the current framework used in this paper. In order to provide some discussion, one would
need recourse to circumstantial evidence and casual observations.
One such circumstantial evidence is the accelerated pace of appreciation of the
CNY/USD spot rate in 2007, compared to 2006, as a sign of success of external political
pressures. On the other hand, it could also be related domestic concerns not captured
by the macroeconomic variables used in this paper. Another circumstantial evidence is
China’s end of US dollar peg on the 19th of June 2010, which has been perceived as a
gesture to the US.13 While the US was still weathering the Global Financial Crisis, it
had exerted continuous pressure on China during the 23 months peg to appreciate the
RMB, especially through SED and JCCT meetings. Second, it is arguable that China
yielded to pressures to ease potential tensions ahead of the G20 meeting in late June
2010.
Lastly, the overall lack of significant effect from the external political pressure on
the RMB could also simply be attributed to errors in measuring the pressure variables,
although we showed earlier that weighting news equally was not too restrictive. This
would require revising the construction of political pressure indicators, however.
7 Concluding comments
This paper adopts an event study methodology to investigate whether political pressure
calling for faster RMB appreciation has a statistically significant effect on the daily
returns and the conditional volatility of both the central parity rate of the RMB exchange
rate and the 12-month RMB non-deliverable forward rate. We create a new dataset
13see http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/19/us-china-yuan-idUSTRE65I11B20100619
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that collates RMB related statements made by foreign officials from the Bloomberg and
the Reuters database, and other sources such as the Library of Congress website. We
quantify external pressures with several binary indicators and find that these indicators
have no influence on daily changes of the CNY/USD spot exchange rate. However,
they do appear to have a statistically significant impact on the conditional volatility of
the RMB exchange rate, especially for those US pressure indicators. We also analyse
whether bilateral Sino-US meetings with a focus on the RMB exchange rate policy have
any impact on both the conditional volatility and daily returns of the central parity rate
of the RMB. We find some evidence that the meetings have an impact on the conditional
volatility of the RMB exchange rate. Moreover, the coefficient of the indicator for Sino-
US meeting is negative implying that volatility declines during the meeting week.
Our analysis indicates that the pace of the RMB appreciation is mostly based on
domestic policy concerns. In particular, the US-China interest rate differential, a key
measure of the costs of sterilisation, appears to be an important determinant in affecting
the pace of the RMB appreciation. On the other hand, Chinese macroeconomic surprise
news are statistically important in determining the 12-month RMB NDF returns. More-
over, there is some evidence that the Sino-US meetings also make the NDF more volatile,
contrary to the central parity rate results. However, US and non-US political pressure
does not seem to affect the conditional variance of the RMB NDF returns.
Our findings appear to have reinforced the notion that external pressure is unlikely
to yield any major changes in Chinas exchange rate policy, although they make the daily
movements of the RMB exchange rate as well as the 12-month NDF rate more volatile.
It is possible that persistent external pressures on the RMB exchange could introduce
market uncertainty and push the RMB appreciation in the long run. However, this
requires to construct a different set of political pressure indicators that can measure the
persistence of political pressures. While not a focus in the current paper, it could be an
interesting question that deserves further research.
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